[Wikileaks/Japan] ABE-PUTIN G-8 SUMMIT: RUSSIA AGREES TO

Viewing cable 07TOKYO2690, ABE-PUTIN G-8 SUMMIT: RUSSIA AGREES TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO2690 2007-06-14 08:12 2011-05-10 05:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo

VZCZCXRO4839
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2690/01 1650812
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140812Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4494
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7420
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1716
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 3478
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 1539
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 3962
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 5109
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 2385
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 0499
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4602
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002690

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET JA RU
SUBJECT: ABE-PUTIN G-8 SUMMIT: RUSSIA AGREES TO
“”ACCELERATE”” TALKS ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES

REF: TOKYO 01267

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D)

¶1. (C) Summary. During their June 7 summit, PM Abe and
President Putin agreed not to shelve the Northern Territories
issue, and Putin promised to instruct his deputies to
“”accelerate”” the negotiations, according to MOFA Russian
Division Director Muto. On North Korea, Putin expressed
frustration at what he claimed was a lack of transparency by
the U.S. in the Six-Party process, but showed greater
understanding of Kim Jong-il’s complex nature and the
abduction issue. Russia has begun to express more interest
in the Asia-Pacific region, Muto noted, a move stoked by
new-found Kremlin concerns about the rise of China. Japan is
prepared to assist Russian integration into the region, but
only if Moscow acts in a “”transparent”” and “”helpful”” manner
that includes both public and private entities. Muto
specifically asked Embassy Tokyo to convey the message that
the U.S. “”can play a role”” in furthering this process. End
Summary.

—————-
Abe-Putin Summit
—————-

¶2. (C) European Affairs Bureau Russian Division Director
Akira Muto briefed Embassy Tokyo Deputy Political Chief June
12 on recent developments in Japan-Russia relations,
including PM Shinzo Abe’s June 7 meeting with Russian
President Putin on the margins of the G-8 Summit. Muto
offered that Japan used the summit opportunity to re-vitalize
an exchange in Russia-Japan dialogue. Tokyo officials were
pleasantly surprised that Putin failed to say anything
negative about bilateral relations with Japan. Putin,
referring to the 2003 Japan-Russia six-part action plan, said
that relations were progressing well in five of the six
fields – the sixth being conclusion of a peace treaty.

¶3. (C) The two leaders agreed that they would not shelve the
Northern Territories issue, Muto related. Putin, according
to Muto, said he was ready to talk, wanted to remove any
obstacles to settlement, and hoped to avoid stagnation in the
discussions. Muto asserted that Putin promised to instruct
his deputies to “”accelerate”” the negotiations. Abe asked for
a clarification of Russia’s plans to “”introduce the
reciprocity principle”” in restricting foreign vessels from
fishing in Russian territorial waters; Putin indicated that
it would be forthcoming. Muto surmised this might mean that
Moscow would begin to charge fishing vessels to fish in
domestic waters – a practice similar to that done for
aircraft crossing Russian Siberian/Arctic air space.

¶4. (C) Japan offered a new proposal to the Russians entitled
“”Initiative for the Strengthening Japan-Russia Cooperation in
the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia”” (e-mailed to EAP/J)
which highlights 8 areas for potential cooperation: energy,
transportation, information/communication, environment,
security, health/medicine, promotion of trade and investment,
and Japan-Russian exchanges.

———–
North Korea
———–

¶5. (C) According to Muto, who attended the G-8 and the
Russian summit meeting, Putin attempted to discuss the Banco
Delta Asia (BDA) issue at the G-8 plenary session, but was
quickly asked by President Bush not to raise the topic in a
public fashion before other G-8 members. Putin, Muto
surmised, raised the issue as a way of highlighting Russian
frustration at what it claimed is a lack of transparency by

TOKYO 00002690 002 OF 003

the U.S. in the Six-Party negotiations. Putin reportedly
asked the President to provide more information, particularly
about intentions to use a Russian bank to transfer BDA funds.

¶6. (C) Putin appeared to hold a “”different attitude”” toward
the DPRK during the G-8 session, Muto observed. Putin
reportedly said that he now understood how complex Kim
Jong-il was, and expressed a fuller understanding of the
abduction issue. Japanese officials assessed that Putin’s
“”threat recognition”” concerning North Korea had not changed
substantially, but that his understanding of the DPRK’s
impact on the region had shifted. Muto stated that Russia’s
original goal of obtaining as much benefit from the Six-Party
process as possible appeared to have changed as well in favor
of a more helpful posture.

¶7. (C) Japan did not attempt to raise the abduction issue at
the bilateral because of time constraints, according to Muto.
Describing Japan’s prior conversations on the issue, he
noted that the Russians have said they want to be helpful on
the abduction issue, but “”don’t count on us”” to resolve the
problem. Moscow did not want the abduction issue to restrict
Russia’s room for maneuver with the DPRK.

———————————————
Reassessing Russia,s Role in the Asia-Pacific
———————————————

¶8. (C) Russia has begun to express more interest in the
Asia-Pacific region, according to Muto. The implications of
this new-found interest would not be limited to bilateral
affairs but would extend throughout the region. According to
Muto, Russia began to re-evaluate Japanese bilateral ties
“”early last year”” when a new Moscow assessment raised Kremlin
concerns about the growth of China. This re-examination
forced Russia, in Muto’s view, to view Japan-Russia relations
in a security context, rather than as simply an economic one,
as Moscow has previously done. Russia’s new perspective on
the altered security environment in East Asia acted as the
primary incentive behind Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov’s
February 27-28 Tokyo visit (reftel), FM Aso’s May 3
discussion with FM Lavrov, and the DFM Denisov-VFM Yachi
strategic dialogue on June 3. Moscow also expressed concern
about the PRC’s ASAT test, and environmental issues such as
the chemical pollution of the Amur River.

¶9. (C) Russia also appeared to be motivated by concerns about
oil resources, Muto claimed. Denisov told his Japan
interlocutors that Moscow placed a high priority on
increasing the percentage of Russia’s oil exports to Asia
from 3% to 30%, and to shift some production from West to
East Siberia by 2020.

——————
Responsible Russia
——————

¶10. (C) Muto said that Japan wants to see a responsible
Russia integrated into the Asia-Pacific region. Tokyo was
prepared to assist Russian development in the region, but
only if Moscow acted in a “”transparent”” and “”helpful”” manner.
Japanese officials would not provide direct investment in
Russia, but would target assistance at areas which the
private sector had already identified as profitable. Muto
noted, by way of example, Japanese plans to take up tenders
being offered by firms associated with Sakhalin 1.

——————–
Areas of Cooperation
——————–

¶11. (C) Cooperation in the field of high-speed rail
transportation, Muto observed, provided another possible

TOKYO 00002690 003 OF 003

field of cooperation. The Russians seemed interested in
obtaining Japanese technology as Moscow considered
establishing rail links between Moscow-St. Petersburg;
Moscow-Sochi; Moscow-Nizhniy-Novgorod; and
Khabarozsk-Vladivostok. Japanese telecommunications company
KDDI hoped to place optical fiber lines between Vladivostok
and Naoetsu, Japan, a step that would decrease internet
response times for Japanese internet users from the current
0.30 seconds (via trans-Pacific lines to the U.S.), to 0.18
seconds using direct Russia-Japan links. That tiny
difference loomed large for industries conducting numerous
financial transactions, he said. Muto, employing
good-natured needling, warned the KDDI plans would negatively
affect its U.S. competitors.

——————
Russia-China Wedge
——————

¶12. (C) Muto asked the Deputy Political Chief to communicate
to Washington that Japan was attempting to involve Russia in
a constructive manner in the Asia-Pacific region. Failure to
encourage Moscow’s integration increased the risk that Moscow
and Beijing might forge a closer strategic partnership – one
that could provide unconstructive proposals. Japan hoped to
“”drive a wedge between Russia and China,”” Muto noted.

¶13. (C) Muto also requested the message be conveyed to
Washington that the Japanese government believes the U.S.
“”can play a role”” in promoting Moscow’s desire to become more
involved in the region. Japan’s on-going program of
financing the dismantlement of retired Russian strategic
nuclear submarines, Muto said, offered opportunities on the
security and environmental front. The main point was that
the U.S. and Japan should avoid the perception that the two
countries were “”ganging up”” on Russia, but were instead
offering to cooperate. Japan was interested in the
environment impact of the dismantlement work and would be
glad to “”divide the labor.””
SCHIEFFER

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