[Wikileaks] U.S./JAPAN DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND

5月 6, 2011

Viewing cable 07TOKYO4442, U.S./JAPAN DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO4442 2007-09-25 08:55 2011-05-07 05:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo

VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #4442/01 2680855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250855Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7879

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 004442

SIPDIS

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STATE FOR ISN A/S ROOD
USDOE FOR NNSA SAOKI/JGLASER/VMCCLELLAND/JCONNERY/MKRUPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: KNNP KHLS TRGY JA
SUBJECT: U.S./JAPAN DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE

REF: TOKYO 4190

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS SCHIEFFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B),(G)

¶1. (SBU) A U.S. delegation led by DOE Deputy Under Secretary
for Counterterrorism Steven Aoki, met July 18-19 with a
Japanese interagency group headed by Takeshi Nakane, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Director General, Disarmament,
Non-Proliferation and Science Department. The Japanese side
consisted of 47 representatives from 12 ministries and
agencies, including the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT),
the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry/Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the
National Police Agency, the Coast Guard, and other emergency
services agencies. The meeting objectives were to (1)
exchange views and discuss the status of U.S.-Japan
cooperation related to physical protection of nuclear
facilities and materials; (2) expand efforts in the area of
emergency response and consequence management to RDD and IND
incidents; (3) exchange views on the threat posed to Japanese
nuclear facilities and material; (4) discuss the use of
simulation and modeling tools to assist in the visualization
of possible attack scenarios; and (5) discuss Japanese views
on an Information Exchange Agreement. Nakane also use the
meeting as an opportunity to review the effect of the July
16, 2007, earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station.

¶2. (SBU) In the aftermath of the earthquake, all seven
reactors have been shut down and will remain that way pending
completion of safety checks by the operator and reviews by
regulators, including NISA (Ref). Prior to the earthquake,
three of the seven reactors at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa station
had been shut down for regularly scheduled maintenance. The
seven reactors generate a total of over 8 GW of electricity.
The total annual power generated in Japan is 241 GW, with
nuclear supplying a total of 46 GW. On an annual basis,
Japan generates approximately seven percent more electricity
than it consumes. However, since summer is a peak time for
energy consumption, there was talk that some idle fossil fuel
plants might be needed to pick up any energy shortages.) The
Japanese side noted there had been a minor radioactive
release via air and water spillage. The causes of these
incidents was under investigation, but in all cases the
Japanese noted the reported releases were not significant.
(See reftel for futher information on the status of the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear facility.)

¶3. (C) The Japanese presented a review of their actions to
improve the physical protection of their nuclear plants.
Over the past two years, Japan has adopted many new and
stringent security measures at their nuclear facilities.
They have fielded a Design Basis Threat that includes
sabotage and have instituted criminal penalties for divulging
security related information. They have enacted new laws in
support of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other international
agreements. The National Police Agency and Cabinet
Secretariat representatives noted that have also added

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round-the-clock security guards by the Riot Police Unit
(equipped with automatic weapons) at nuclear facilities.
They look forward to the next round of bilateral discussions
on physical protection to be held in Japan later this
calendar year.

¶4. (C) The U.S. proposal to conduct a workshop on
responding to radiological dispersal device (RDD) and
improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents is under
consideration by the GOJ. Nakane stated such a workshop
involves many ministries, going well beyond the purview of
those involved primarily in commercial nuclear oversight.
The attending ministry representatives agreed to review the
U.S. proposal and Nakane said he would deliver a response in
the near future.

¶5. (C) The sides exchanged information and their thoughts
on the current threat situation. The U.S. presented a DIA
briefing on the threat posed to Japanese facilities by North
Korea, considered low at this time. The briefing also
provided possible attack scenarios including possible force
strength. The briefing was supplemented by a U.S.
presentation on a tactical simulation of an attack on a
hypothetical nuclear facility. The Japanese talk centered on
possible Al-Qaida threats. The Japanese side noted that
since they are a staunch ally of the U.S. and have
contributed to the mission in Iraq and Afganistan, they have
put themselves at risk. This view was in stark contrast to
that espoused by the GOJ two years ago, when they doubted the

Al-Qaida threat to their homeland.

¶6. (SBU) In that light, the U.S. has spoken with Japanese
counterparts on the use of simulation and modeling tools to
help visualize possible attack scenarios. These tools are
used in the U.S. to supplement current testing methodologies
(both rules and performance based). While there was great
interest, there seemed to be some confusion as to which
ministry would have the lead on such cooperation. The use of
these tools would also be useful in visualizing attack
scenarios during Japan’s upcoming G-8 presidency.

¶7. (C) Nakane was less hopeful regarding an Information
Exchange Agreement. He believes that such an Agreement would
require Diet approval which would be difficult to get through
due to the sensitive nature of the information being
exchanged. He suggested we continue within the current
framework and expressed appreciation at the understanding of
the U.S.

¶8. (SBU) One new topic discussed was the possibility of
cooperation in the technology and use of non-lethal force
during transportation. The National Police Agency
representative stated that they needed more time to review
their use of such technology and that it could be included in
future technology cooperation efforts.

¶9. (SBU) This cable was cleared by Deputy Under Secretary
Aoki subsequent to the delegation’s departure.
Schieffer

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